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OF THE MEANING OF LEBENSWELT
I. PHILOSOPHY OF THE LEBENSWELT
Although Merleau-Ponty's philosophy can be attributed
to many so-rces, there is no doubt that he is first and fore-
most a phenomenologist. The articles he wrote at the beginning
of his philosophical career all concerned phenomenology.~
His major work, the Phenomenology of Perception was the first
work published in the French phase of the Phenomenological
movement that beared the title 'phenomenology'. It is there¬
fore necessary to account for his relationship with the
phenomenological movement, especially his relationship with
its founder, Husser!, in explicating his philosophical views.
Merleau-Ponty's phenomeno1ogy is intimate1y linked to
the notion of 'Leberswelt' (the lived world) which is central
to Husserl's later philosophy. From the preoccupation with
a pure logic and theory of science in the Logical Investigations
in the early period, Husserl's centre of interest shifted to
the establishment of a pure,., transcendental ego (through the
introduction of the 'phenomenological reduction' and the
deepened notion of 'intentionality') which not only provides
a foundation for the certainty of objective knowledge but is
also the foundation of nature. Then as the Nazis came to power
in the forties, Husserl, in his old age, began to realize that
the whole of European rationality was at stake, because
its ideal of reason had become alienated from its roots during
the whole course of the history of philosophy. The only way
to recover these roots is to initiate the enterprise of tran¬
scendental phenomenology in which rationality is founded anew
on the articulations of the Leberswelt. It is hoped that through
restoring experience to the Lebenswelt and making it the so1e
subject of our reflection, theoretical knowledge can be tied
to its roots in the practical world of man and revealed as
idealizations of the Lebenswelt.
Merleau-Ponty takes up the notion of Lebenswelt and sub¬
mits it to a radical conversion. He rejects the possibility
of an absolute ego, an ego which is situated beyond and out¬
side the world, and yet constitutes the world because man,
being engaged in the world, is not capable of an all embracing
perspective from which to comprehend the whole world. Moreover,
reflective sonsciousness is incapable of constituting the
world because reflection is made possible by the pre-reflective
experience in which the world is already constructed. The
Lebenswel t which precedes reflection cannot be completely
subjected to the pheromenological reduction (through which
truths transcending the world are supposed to be disclosed).
The theme of the Lebenswel.t is not manageable in terras of a
transcendental phenomenology which itself must undergo an
existential turn. We live in an interworld, the field of human
praxis? and the task of phenomenology is not to reduce its
structures to consciousness but to describe and articulate
this world as it is lived by us. The ideal of rationality is
not to provide a foundation for the sciences, gs has been
envisaged by Husserl in his later years, but to progressively
clarify the world's meaning for us.3
II. HORIZON OF THE BODY
Merleau-Ponty has at his disposal an original and radic¬
ally new notion through which to explicate the meaning of the
pre-ref1ective wor d: the body subject. The notion of 'body-
subject' emerged from his critique of psychology in his first
book, The Structure of Behavior. In this book he defined
man by his ability to project intentions into his milieu, the
world which is given through perception. Both perception and
intention-projection take place within the horizon of the
body: we can perceive the world by virtue of the body which
is at the same time our means of transcending it. In The
Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty describes our ori-
ginal (pre-reflective or pre-conscious) contact with the world
through the perceptions of the body-subject.
It may seem strange that subjectivity should be attributed
to the body which is usually viewed as an object, a thing among
things, and a prison for the human spirit. In Descr£ftes sub-
jectivity is characterized by sel f-consciousress; in Kant
subjectivity is the foundation of both moral law and natural
law- As for Merleau-Porty, there is no denying that subject-
ivity is manifested at the level of conscious experience. But
he claims that there is a level of experience at which we
cannot claim to be fully conscious but in which we can still
witness ourselves as the centre of many fields of meaning. At
this level, the self is exactly the body. In other words there
are many fields of meaning which cannot be said to have been
originated from our consciousness but which are yet meaning-
ful for the body and cannot come into existence without re-
4
ference to the body.
The body has the capacity for motion. It can perform
different actions and move about within a certain limit set
by its own structure. Within this range of possibilities
there is a space-for-us, i.e. with referece to the range
of our mobility things are for us far-away or c1 ose by, high
or low, right or left. This is a space different from the ab-
solute space of Newton in which it is meaning]ess to speak
about distant or near, high or low. We cannot rid ourselves
of this oriented space however much we imagine or know about
our possible situations, although we can modify it by the use
of implements, e.g. the automobile can modify our sense of
5
distance but not eliminate it.
It is also through our bodies that we have different
fields of the senses: the visual field, the sonorous field,
the tactile field, the field of odours and flavours. The col-
ours, sounds, odours and flavours etc. that appear in these
fields cannot be entirely be illusory; the meaning of this
distinction originates from them, not the other way round.
On the other hand, these fields of meaning cannot come into
being independently of our bodily capacities e.g. it is mean-
ingless to describe colours to a blind man. We carrot ascribe
the existence of these fields of meaning to consciousness sir ce
consciousness merely discovers them and, except through the
execution of the body, cannot freely opt for their annihilation
6
or creation.
Sexual meaning obviously arises exclusively in connect-
ion with our bodily capacity. It is not founded on conscious-
ness and freedom ana is indeed itself a problem for freedom
and morality. The child who has not yet reached puberty is
incapable of understanding this meaning. When, however, this
meaning gradually emerges for him in puberty, he needs time
to orientate himself to the social implications of this rnean-
7
ing.
Fields of meaning arise when the body is set to perform
various tasks. We succeed in learning to type, to dance or
to play on an organ only when the body is able to execute the
movements without knowing it explicitly. Here objective des-
criptions and knowledge of the loci of dancing steps, the pos-
ition and movement of keyboards, are in sufficient. Eventually
our body and 1imbs must perform the movements through the
k
development of babits which make cor scious interpretatiors
unnececessary. This acquisition is a special form of under-
standing and is wholly immersed in action. Merleau-Ponty
calls this the 'practognosis' of the body-subject. The body
takes up the meanings of various tasks implicitly. It 'knows'
how to type, to dance and to play on the keyboard. Underlying
the celebrated Cogito of Descrates there exists a more
fundamental motoric capacity: an 'I can'. It orientates
itself to its milieu and knows it.
III. CONTINGENT DISTINCTION BETWEEN MEANING AND MEANINGLESSNESS
The preceeding examples show that the body surges forth,
directs and opens itself onto the world so that realms of
meaning can come to be. In this sense we can speak of an oper¬
ative intentionslity in the body by virtue of which the body
assumes the character of a subject. It acts and situates itself
in the world -receiving while at the same time transfiguring
the world's influence on it. Various fields of meaning arise
as a result of this dialectical interchange which resembles
a question end answer session in which the question is set time
and again in the world for us to answer by projecting bodily
actions in accordance with formed csttems of meaning. In this
dialogue both parties are active. This implies that although
all meaning is meaning for the body subject, and we can in a
certain sense say that man is fee measure of meaning, we must
not conclude that there exist an absolute norm by which we can
distinguish, once and for all, meaning from meeninglessness,
sense from non-sense.Por in the first place the body subject is
not an absolute point that can exist outside its world. As wit¬
ness to the birth of meaning it is always involved and situated
in the world. Moreover the situated body-subject is always in
the process of transcending its given milieu, taking it up to¬
wards a future. Neither the body-subject nor the world possessed
an absolute, eternal character which is the prerequisite for ther
being an absolute norm Merleeu-Ponty calls the given world of
stability 'being' and the body-subject -existence1u The trans¬
cendence of existence over being is caught up in the movement of
temporality. In the chapter in his Phenomenology he even identi¬
fies the subject with temporality insofar as it reaches out
for its own pest end
from the depth of it projects itself towards the future.
Both meaning and meaning1essness (sense and non-sense',
then are co-present ir the contingent world (the ambiguous
worl d of sense and nor.-sen se) and the question or distinguish¬
ing one from the other always remains a task in man's history.
In this dialogue with the world man can establish fields of
meaning from out of meaninglessness without making a perm¬
anent distinction therein, because our future is not fully
transparent to us and may require us to recast the boundaries
of meaning from time to time.
IV. THE LEVELS OF MEANING
There is admittedly a level of experience in which we
are bound to the particularity of bodily perception. But in
considering the problem of meaning we must also take into
account the transcendence of cur particularity in knowledge,
for the rea1m of know1edge and scientific truth is oroperlv
a field of meaning. As ore critic has argued:
From the standpoint of the body's sensitivity to
temperature, we have here an example of the distinct-
ion between, meaning an d meaning! essness. The physic¬
ist, however, who studies the phenomenon of heat
transcends this distinction, and the same is true
of the technologist who works with high temperatures.
A certain degree of light is agreeable to the eve,
anothe r is painful or torturous, and there is also
a degree of light which destroys out power of siont.
This distinction concerns us insofar as we see by
means of the body, but not insofar as we think
with our mind.
Merleau-Ponty is aware of the universal nature of know-
kedge and the inadequacy of his treatment of the different
levels of meaning in the Phenomenology of Perception. In a
footnote to his essay The Metaphysical in Man published in
1947, later reprinted in his collection of essays Sense and
11
Non-sense, he wrote:
It would obviously be in order to give a precise
description of the passage of perceptual faith into
explicit truth as we encounter it on the level of
language, concept, and the cultural world. We intend
to do so in a work devoted to The Origin of Truth.
The Phenomena]oqy of Perception is after a]] primarily
a work devoted to the description of our pre—reflective contaci
with the world. Articul atioi of meaning at higher 3.eve1 s is
-not 'its main concern. It is therefore unfortunate that he died
1 2.
before finishing his work oh the origin of truth, and
left hi.5 general account of meaning merely in an unfinished
state.
V. MERLEAU-PONTY'S APPROACH TO THE BODY-SUBJECT
As Merleau-Ponty is seeking to describe the body's
pre-conscious contact with the world, he cannot approach his
subject matter through a method of reflection, e.g. the eidetic
reduction or the phenomenoloqical reduction which are supposed
to be relevant only to the level of conscious experience.
Neither can he employ the method of induction which tends to
establish causal relations, because at the 1evel of bodily
perception the body-subject and the world are involved in
a dialeactical interchange in which neither is the sole
cause of the other Vie normally take this. interscharge as
well as its results for granted and will not be aware of this
mutual bond until its operations are disturbed, such as in
case of illness, disablement, psychical deviations or under
specially devised experimental conditions Among these, Merleau—
Ponty sees especially in the pathology of bodily activities
such as apraxia, agnosia and aphasia a way of approach which
permits him to penetrate into the dialogue between the body
13
and the world to make observations. It is hoped that
glimpses of this region of pre-conscious darkness can be
instrumental in paradoxically casting light on the fields of
meaning that we discover in conscious life. The difficulty
of access to the pre-conscious level of experience, however,
leads to the consequence that there can never be a fully
developed systematic picture regarding the original contact
of the body with the world. Moreover, as illuminated by
the level of pre-conscious darkness, our conscious life
seems to lose its obviousness, and the more Merleau-Ponty
succeeds in relating it to its obscure basis in the pre-
conscious, the more difficult will it be for the account to
14
be clear—cut and lucid.
VI. MERLEAU-PONTY'S PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE
In a public lecture, delivered in 1951, Merleau-Ponty
said that besides the deepening of the notion of the flesh
into a 'body-subject', another characteristic of half a
century's investigation in philosophy is a recognition of
a strange relationship between consciousness and its language,
15
as between consciousness and its body. Merleau-Ponty
attaches much Importance to the questions of language and
returns to them from time to time in his writings. We have
mentioned above that Merleau-Ponty studies cases in patho¬
logical behaviour with a view to depicting the body's pre-.
conscious dialogue with the wor1d. Implicit in his attempts
is the unsubstantiated thesis that al1 conscious life is
founded on the pre-conscious in spite of our difficulty in
gaining access to it. Nevertheless, as one of his expositors,
Rerny C. Kwant, has said, he had made certain attempts to-
show the truth of his perspective, the most striking of which
si g
is his philosophy of language. If Merleau-Ponty can
interpret language and speech, which is commonly considered
as the vehicle of thought and which throws lights on reality,
asaspecial aspect of the body-subject's movement of trans¬
cendence, in which its dialouqe with the world is elevated to
another plane, thereby transforming our existence, then his
i 7
thesis is at least substantiated to a certain extent.
Thus we cannot view Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of language
in isolation but must consider it as fundamental to his
whole philosophy. To put his philosophy of language suc¬
cinctly: Thought is co-extensive with speech which is
essentially founded on the body-subject; thought is incarnated
in the system of linguistic signs employed in speech; lingu¬
istic signs thus function as flesh for language
CHAPTER TWO
SIGNS AND THE ACQUISTITION OF LANGUAGE
After the publication of the Phenomenology of Perception,
Merleau-Ponty had written a great deal on the linguistics of
the structuralist linguist Ferdinand de Saussure. Merleau-
Ponty seemed to have found in the latter's work an invalu¬
able extension of his own views on language. Saussure's
' diacritic' .view of signs and meaning is not only compatible
with Merl eau—Por ty' s thesis on the speaking subject,, It a1 so
provides Merl eau-Porty's description of the speech act with
an internal articulation. Sii ce Merleau-Ponty tends to
consider science (in this case linguistics) an essentia'
moment in the elucidation of human experience, and he never
expounds his own views without reference to results and
findings in disciplines other than philosophy, it seems
appropriate that we first outline briefly Saussure's
general position (together with Merleau-Ponty's Interpretation
of it) before giving an exposition of Merleau-Ponty's views.
I. LANGUAGE AS NOMENCLATURE
What we have 1 earned.from Saussure, says Merleau-Ponty,
Is that, taken singly, signs do not signify anything, and
that each of them does not so much express a meaning as mark
1
a divergence of meaning between itself and other signs.
This is indeed another way of expressing the Saussurean
principle that language is made up of only differences
p
without positive terms.' This, observes Merl eau-Ponty, is
a difficult idea.
It is easy to say that language is merely a cluster of
names given to concepts or meanings and that sounds pertain¬
ing to different ]angrages may be ernployed to designate the
same concept or meaning. This fact, after all, is clearly
borne out by looking up the dictionary in which nomenc]ature
and meaning are set in a convenient order. However, this
view would leave unexplained the difficulties in translation
as well as difficulties involved in learning a second langu¬
age. If there were concepts or meanings fixed on the one
hand and alternative systems of sounds pertaining to the
various natural languages on the other, then in learning
a foreign language one would only be learning a different
system of sound and graphic combinations, and there would
be no occasion for the translator to hesitate on the choice
of the appropriate word., since translation would in that
case be only phonic or graphic transcription. Moreover, if
language is merely a nomenclature related to universal con¬
cepts or meanings that exist independent of it-? the con¬
cepts or meanings would themselves be capable of surviving
linguistic changes without beirg modified. As a matter of
fact, however, any student of language can easily give
examples of linguistic evolution in which the concept or
meaning of an ordinary word has undergone changes so radical
that there does not seem to be a link between the old and
new concepts or meanings. And any bilingual or trilingual
person can readily point out the divergent conceptual cover¬
age of apparently the same word in different languages, e.g.
to know in English, French and German, to love in English,
French and Chinese. Each language not only entails a differ¬
ent use of the vocal chord, but divides and organizes the
world into different categories and boundaries 6f meanings.
II. SYSTEM OF DIFFERENCES WITHOUT POSITIVE TERMS
Language, then consists of a spectrum of sound (the
signifier or sign) related to a spectrum of conceptual
possibilities (the signified or signification); each
natural language organizes and articulates both spectrums
in its own distinctive way that marks itself off from an¬
other natural language. Against such a background, one can
fruitfully ask the fundamental question regarding the com¬
ponents of language: what is meant by saying that language
consists only of differences? How can there be differences
among terms if there are no positive terms?
To explain this, let us consider the problem of identity
See end of chapter.
in linguistics. Suppose I say the word gentlemen! several
times in a lecture, what is the basis on which we say that
the same linguistic unit has been uttered several times?
If we say it is the identity in sound in the several occurenc
of the word, we have already begged the question in ascribing
different portions of a string of noise the same name. In
fact, each actual utterance of 'the1 word is a new phonic
andpsychological fact in time. Taken physically, the actual
pitch and tone may vary during the whole lecture. Moreover,
human voice varies considerably from person to person and
the voice of an individual may vary within a day depending
on the condition of his health and the degree of fatigue.
An answer to this is that the sigrifier is not an actual
portion of the string of fioice. It Is an abstract unit of
CI
some kind which must not be confused with the uttered sounds.J
Indeed the actual pronounciations may vary and we would still
count them as versions of the same signifier, so long as they
do not become confused with other signifiers that stand in
contrast to them. For example in a dialogue In which the
signifier doq often occurs, we can vary its utterance within
a( ertain range and still have the same identical signifier,
so long as that range of sounds does not become confused with
boq, cog, fog, hog, 1oq, dock, talk, cock, rock, knock; drop,
jot, ho t, pot, god, dot; and, of course, not with duc.k, doe
and dip.
The identity of a signifier in time is a relational one.
By saying that it is abstract, we do not mean that it exists
in a Platonic or Husserlian world of transcendental ideas as
an archetype of its copies in the sensible world. We simply
mean that a signifier exists and has identity insofar as it
can be differentiated from other contrasting signifiers within
a system. This relational identity is similar to that of the
units of chess which are defined in relation to a system of
rules that differentiate, say, the pawn, from the queen and
bishop. Thus identity is wholly a function of differences
6
within a system. The units of language do not possess a
thing-like nature: given, discrete, completed and existing
by itself- They are not positive entities. They are abstract
and relational. Thus, Saussure says, language has r either
ideas nor sounds that existed before the linguistic system,
but only conceptual and phonic differences that have issued
7
from the system. Language arbitrarily divides and delimits
its own spectrum of sound and the conceptual field. Its units
consequently do not possess any positive nature and can only
be defined in contra stive relations to one another.
III. CONSEQUENCES: LATERAL MEANING AND INCOMPLETE EXPRESSION
Thus in language, as in other realms of culture, the parts
obtain their meaning and existence within a whole and the whole
is immanent in its parts. One consequence of this principle
is that concepts or meanings do not stand .behind signifies s
or words in one-to-one correspondence. Nowhere can we con-
8
front a_ word and its signigication. Since meaning or con¬
cept emerges as a consequence of the differential and con-
trastive relations among signifiers or words, it is entirely
involved in language. Speech always comes into play against
a background of speech; it is always only a fold in the immense
9
fabric of language. In other words, it is the lateral
relations among signifiers that endow each of them with mean¬
ing: meaning or concept appears or1 y at the ir tersectior of
signifiers. Thus, against intellectualist theories of language
which makes a pure consciousness the foundation and originator
of meaning, Saussure (and Merleau-Ponty who endorses such a
view) would assert that meaning is founded on the differences,
contrasts, and oppositions within the system of language and
is created in the act of speech.
This leads us to a further point. If meaning or concept
is relational and differential in nature, and is created within
the system of language that exists prior to it, then the birth
of meaning is never complete. Archaic and latent grammatical
forms may gradually become operative, new oppositions and
contrasts may occur within current usage, structures and com¬
binations of linguistic units may fall into disuse or become
transformed, so that the relations among signs become unstab1e.
Meaning is caught up ir the historical evo]utior of language;
it is contingent. Mo language can succeed in capturing thing
themselves by transforming them into their meaning which is
immutable and resistant to time. The language we speak gives
us the false impression that it has reflected the ultimate
articulations of being when it is actually the internal opera-
10
tion of signs upon each other that make us feel at home.
Mo expression is ultimate or complete because this ultimacy
or completeness is an illusion and different languages with
divergent phonic and conceptual differentiations may still
articulate the world in their own ways.
IV. LANGUAGE LEARNING IN THE CHILD
The Saussurean principle is particularly illuminating
when we consider how the child learns his first language.
From the first month onwards the child is generally attracted
by the adult's language which is addressed to him. Language
generates attitudinal reponses in the child and stimulates
11
first his limbs, and then his phonatory organs.' From four
months to ten months the child lingers at certain sounds and
modulates them. Nuances, rhythms and stresses are drawn from
12
the adults' language and repeated. At the twelve month the
child can speak its first word voluntarily. It has long been
established that for the child the first word functions as
13
a sentence. From then on the child begins to re-invent for
himself the whole phonemic system. The phonemes are like
tones while words are comparable to melodies which the child
%
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can play as variation of his owi speech apparatus. It is
through this modulation of sounds that the child acquires the
principle of a mutua1 differentiation of phonemes and signi-
fiers and at the same time discovers for himself the mearing
1 S
of words. At a certait stage in the acquistitior of the
phonemic system there appears the phenomenon of what lingu¬
ists call 'deflation': the child suppresses the wealth of
sounds he could produce in babbling, dropping those sounds
that are not used in the phonemic system of the adult language
as though sounds have begun to take on a significative value
for him so that he must restrain himself for the sake of
acquiring a style which is the phonemic system,, The phonemic
structures of language finally become the rules of vocaliza-
i 6
tion for him.
It is worth nothing that the child imitates sounds and
acquires the phonemic system without the mediation of any
representation of speech movements (articulatory gestures).
Even for adults, the representation of muscular contraction
is not necessary in effecting bodily movements. It is practi¬
cally impossible because our consciousness is unaware of them.
(This is especially true for the chiid who is ignorar t of
1 7
anatomy.) Our bodies are moved by goals and objects, and
in the case of speech, by the interlocutor's words or our
own words. Hence the phenomenon of imitation in the child's
process of language learning cannot be explained by the
representation of movements. Having only consciousness of
things and events, the child first imitates the results of
adult speech by directly usirg his own means (his own body),
and thereby finding hirnsel f producing the same speech move-
l8
ments as the adult.~ In fact, imitation should be under¬
stood as an encounter of two actions around the same object
and to imitate is not to act like others, but to obtain the
19
same result as others. It aims at the global result, not
the details of an action. For example, when the child, which
sits opposite an adult, turns to look in the -same direction
as the adult, the imitation is not kinesthetic since his act¬
ual movement differs from the exact movement of the adult.
We can neither say that the child has made consciously a left-
right transposition. It can only be concluded that for the
2(
child the adult's action is the goal that he adopts in turn.
Achievement of the global result of speech is exactly the same
as that of other bodily gestures since vocal imitation is
21
merely a particular case of imitation in general.'' The facts
of language learning according to Merieau-Ponty, attest the
transcendence of the body towards the realm of signs.
V. LANGUAGE AS SOCIAL INSTITUTI01
We must mention a distinction which Saussure makes if
we are to understand the full significance of Saussure's 1
linguistics, which has been recognized as the forerunner of
structuralism and semiology.
So far we have seen that a sign, be it the signifier
or the signified, derives its relational identity and meaning
from a whole, a system which consists of differences, contrasts
and oppositions. If we wish to define signs we must look to
the system of relations and distinctions which creates them.
We must therefore distinguish between language, the abstract
system which constitutes signs, and speech, the physical
realization or manifestation of language. Only the former,
language, is the proper object of linguistics becuase the
linguist's business is to identify those elements that are
2 2
functional in creating signs within the system.The general
significance of this distinction is that it is essentially
oi
a distinction between institution and event, between the
underlying system which make possible various types of beha-
23
viour and actual instances of such behaviour.' For in line
with the thought of two other modern masters, Durkheim and
Freud, Saussure holds that individual behaviour is meaningful
only insofar as it is viewed within a system of social norms
and institutions (the system of linguistic oppositions).
Although the latter is a product of human activities, it has
in turn become the condition which makes human actions
24
possible.' Moreover, the systems of 1irguistic rues, socia1
norms, and psychical equilibrium is always at work without
our being aware of it; the systems are not immediately given
and yet are immanent in our actions and govern them over¬
whelmingly. In this perspective, the source of meaning is
no longer the conscious subject, as has been posited by
philosophical systems of intellectualism, but is the social
system. The whole enterprise of the human sciences thus con¬
sists in what is called a Mde—constructionM or ncle-certeringn
of the conscious subject, in which the various functions of
the subject are attributed to the respective systems of socia1
25
norms, rules of language and psychical mechanism. Meaning
belongs to the world, not to the conscious subject. The
conscious subject is situated back in the world and enjoys
no previleged status over the world such as it has enjoyed
in the systems of Descrates, Kant, and Husserl. The import¬
ance of the subject has been superseded by the structures of
the social world.
These systems can be comprehended under the theme of the
Lebenswelt: as its articulations. Perhaps with these arti¬
culations Husserl's philosophy of the Lebenswelt would not
have become a transcendental egology, a phenomenology with
the conscious subject as centre. It remains to see how
Mer1eau-Ponty can interpret speech as the transcendence of
the body-subject towards the system of signs and transfigures
the stock of ready-made meanirgs into a field of meaning
which exists for the speaking subject.
Throughout this chapter I would use the term
'signifier' for the sake of convenience and
avoid using terms like 'word' or 'sign' unless
the context requires otherwise.
CHAPTER THREE
THE INCARNATION OF THOUGHT IN THE
FLESH OF LANGUAGE
I. COMMON SENSE AND THE EMPIRICIST VIEWS OF LANGUAGE
Human life is interwoven with the phenomenon of
language. No study of man, be it philosophical or anthro-
pological, can claim to be complete if the question of
language is left untouched and not given its proper place
in the whole context of 'human nature'. Language is commonly
taken to be a system of signs with corresponding meanings
and rules of grammar. Possessing fixed determinations, lan¬
guage is dead until It is employed by man in speech. And
speech is commonly taken to be an expression of inner thought
in the mind of man. Each mature person possesses the
capacity for language, and when one is addressed by a
person, or when one sees something interesting in the
presence of one's friend, the brain Is excited bv the•X- mj
stimuli and a chain of reactions would propagate themselves
through the nervous system bringing about the articulation
of a word or words by the vocal organs. Or else, one can
posit the existence of verbal images in the mind of the
speaker which can be elicited by the speaker's states of
consciousness through the mechanism of acquired associations.
In both cases, whether the explanation be physiological or
psychological, speech occurs in the third person. There Is
no speaker, there Is a flow of words set in motion independ¬
ently of any Intention to speak.Man is passive insofar
as his speaking Is determined by external stimuli, and
the empiricist can only show that language 'comes over'
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the speaker, not that the speaker is speaking.
II. INTELLECTUALIST VIEWS OF LANGUAGE
A. STUDIES IN APHASIA
Discoveries in the pathology of language particul¬
arly in aphasis, however, have orientated the theory of
language in an Idealist or intellectualist direction.
An aphasiac is one who has lost the normal power of speech
as a result of brain injury. He retains the original stock
of words which he possessed before the injury was inflicted
in the cortex of his brain, but he has lost a certain way
of using them. The scholars of aphasia differentiates betweer
a 'concrete language' and a 'categorial language'. In con¬
crete situations which require the patient to say certain
words in response, as say, when he goes to buy a packet
of cigarette at the corner of the street, or when a friend
says 'good morning to him in the morning, the normal flow
of w7ords in reply is not lacking. But when asked to classify
red objects mingled with a collection of objects of differ-
ent colours, or when he is asked how morning differs from
night, the patient, in the former case, will be at a loss
as to the course of action he should take, or, in the latter
case, will simply turn dumb. For the same reason, it is sense¬
less to ask him in summer how he feels in winter. The
patient's actions and responses are bound within his world
of immediate impressions, the world of particular concrete
objects and blind habits. Although his capacity for ling-
usitic utterance is still there, he can no longer use words
categorially and in hypothetical, imagined contexts. The
patient exhibits exactly those traits of 'human nature'
depicted in mechanistic theories regarding the nature of
speaking: his speech is the response triggered off by verbal
stimulus. He cannot employ language in a free and abstract
way. He cannot represent to himself what is not concretely
present before him. For example, in cases of amnesia (in which
the patient is unable to name colours set before him), even
when the patient succeeds at times to name the colour of
a certain object, he does so in a round about way. He cannot
comprehend the concrete colour of a cherry as red and subsume
it under a category, he can only employ formulas like 'cherry-
red' or 'bottle-green' in arriving at the colour name 'red'.
According to the analyses of psychologists like Gelb and
Goldstein, the inability to identify colour samples is a
sign, not that certain verbal images of the word 'red' or
'green' have been lost, but that the patient has lapsed back
from the categorical attitude of the normal consciousness
to the concrete attitude of the pathological conscious-
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ness. Such analyses lead us from the empiricist theory of
verbal image to the intellectualist theory which asserts
the conditioning of language by thought or what is called
the categorial function of consciousness.
B. CRITICISM OF INTELLECTUALIST VIEWS
In the chapter on speech in the Phenomenalogy of
Perception Merleau-Ponty, in line with his programme of
incarnating consciousness in the body-subject, takes the
int ell actualists to task and seeks to develop from t he-
findings of Goldstein himself an existentialist theory of
aphasia. He points out that both empiricist or mechanistic
conceptions and the intellectualist ones are, in the first
s
place, at one in denying that the word has significance.
In the theory of verbal images, the word is summoned up
through a causal or associations! chain, and is thus not
the bearer of its own meaning; it has no inner power. In
the theory of categorial operation the word is also deprived
of its own effectiveness because it is considered to be an
external sign of an internal recognition, an empty container
of a meaning which is secreted in thought. In the first
there is nobody to speak; in the second, there is certainly
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a subject, but a thinking one, not a speaking one.
Ill, THE WORD HAS MEANING7
It is characteristic of Merleau-Ponty1s philosophical
style that before he expounds his own views he first considers
two or more one-sided views juxtaposed in opposition to one
another, He never develops a theme in philosophy without
reference to the philosophical tradition and the pertaining
historical contexts, Thus when in accordance with the whole
theme of incarnating consciousness in the body-subject, he
situates the thinking subject in the speaking subject, he
?
Introduces his thesis as a criticism of intellectualist
theories which assert the primacy of thought over language,
If thought is merely contained in dispensable words
and expressions, and If talking is simply an accompaniment
of words to a cognitive intention or a representative thought,
then many aspects of the phenomenon of speech will become
In exp1icable;
why thought tends towards expression as towards
Its completion, why the most familiar thing appears
indeterminate as long as we have not recalled its
name, why the thinking subject himself is in a kind
of ignorance of his thoughts so long as he has not
formulated them for himself, or even spoten and
written them, as Is shown by the example of so
many writers who begin a book without knowing exactly
what they are going to put into It,
In short without the very presence of words and expressions
in speech or writing, thought cannot come into being. Words
whether in speech or writing, fasten thoughts together and
endow them with a foothold in the world. To name an object
is not a consequence of an intellectual act of recognition,
it is itself recognition. Thus authentic speech is not a
mere translation of ready-made thought in the mind, but an
accomplishment of that thought.
The listener can only receive thought through the
speaker's speech itself. In genuine communication in which
a message is got across from one subject to the other, the
listener does not simply put meaning into heard utterances
thereby effecting an understanding of the speaker. If cons¬
ciousness, in an encounter with the Other, could understand
only what it has itself put Into the experience of hearing
the speech of the Other, i.e. if consciousness can under¬
stand only what it construes to be, if It can understand only
its own projected meanings within a monadic world, then the
experience of communication would have been illusory, !i...
the problem being how, to all appearances, consciousness
learns something, the solution cannot consist in saying that
Of course, after the completion of a thought in words
the embodied thought becomes ready-made In the future
when references to it are made.
„ Q fS
it knows everything in advance. Iderleau-Ponty suggests that
10.
there is a gestural meaning immanent in speech which determ¬
ines the conceptual meaning ultimately formed in the listeners
mind. Although it is not contested that the listener can
only understand the Other through the language he has already
possesssed, and each word heard awakens thoughts with which
he is already familiar, r,,,fthese meanings sometimes com¬
bine to form new thought which recasts them all, and we are
11
transported to the heart of the matter, we find the source'
After going through the indeterminate path of understanding,
after taking up the thought of others through •speech, re¬
flecting in others, thinking according to them, we finally
grasp the meaning or theme which retrospectively endows
the original data, which we have heard, with the virtue of
being adequate to the presentation of thought. Merleau-Ponty
cites the examples of painting and music which are themselves
language in a broad sense. A school of music or painting
which is at first not understood, eventually, by its own action,
creates its own public, if it really says something; that
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is, it does so by secreting its own meaning.' Meaning is
in the configurations formed by the signs, whether the signs
themselves be the colours of the palette or the crude sounds
of instruments, or the constituted lexicon of an existing
language. In literary works the sense of the piece of work,
conveyed by the commonly accepted meaning of words, contributes
to modifying the existing words themselves. And this con-
figural meaning- what Merleau-Ponty calls 'gestural'-
in both speech and writing is overlooked by intellectualisn
which fails to realise that thought is in words.
To elucidate the point further, it is necessary for
us to go back to the phenomenon of speech itself and art¬
iculate its internal structure.
IV. THE PRODUCTION OF SPEECH
A. THE INTIMACY BETWEEN THE BODY AND THE WORD
When the speaking subject speaks his thoughts in
words, there is no prior process of representaion or position
of objects or relations. The orator does not think before or
in the course of speaking because his speech is his thought.
And when a text is read with expression, there exists no
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thought marginal to the text itself. During the process
of speech, understanding can be achieved, without a single
thought intervening and it is only after the process that
reflections on it can begin. Words are behind me, like things
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behind my back.'1 To learn a word is to be acquainted with
Why Merleau-Ponty calls this 'gestural' will be
explained later in the section on 'linguistic gesture'
it in its styles of formation. I possess its articulator
and acoustic styles as one of the possible modulations or
uses of my body. 1 reach out for the acquainted word with¬
out an intervening thought or representation, and the only
sense in which we can talk of the representation of a
word is the practical utterance of it; to represent it is
to utter it. The word has a certain location in my ling-
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uistic world, and is part of my equipment, My reaching
for it: or my utterance of it is one of the modalities of
my phonetic gesticulation, in the same way as my inhabita¬
tion in the wrorld of imagination is one of the modalities
of my being-in-the-worId. We accomplish this phonetic
gesticulation through the body. Fpeaking is the body's
projection of a speaking intention into vocal form in which
the articulatory style of a word is unfolded in the sensi¬
ble world of sound.
B. MEANING IN THE LINGUISTIC GESTURE
According to studies in modern psychology the percep¬
tion of human emotions expressed in gestures is not accom¬
plished by way of association or by analogical reasoning.
The emotion of anger, for example, is not something hidden
behind the angry gesture; it is ax-rayed all over the gesture
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itself'; it is in it. The gesture does not make us decipher
the emotion because it is anger itself and we perceive it
by a direct reading. In the gesture I encounter the outline
of an intentional object. The moment my own intentions and
gestures of which I am capable reciprocate with the gestures
of others, I.e. when the powers of my body adjust themselves
to his gesture and overlap it, communication Is achieved,
and this is done without the intervention of a cognitive
operation. It is as If the other person's Intention In-L x
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habited my body and mine his. J Here we must go beyond the
Intellectual analyses or proofs of'' o ther mInds' which• r
attempt to replace this mute resonance among body gestures
with conceptual ratocination.
The meaning of the linguistic gesture Is likewise given
in the gesture itself. There seems to be a disparity between
a linguistic gesture and a non-Unguis tic one, for the latter
is a happening in the world of natural perception open to
everyone, while the former seems to point towards a mental
world which Is not given to everybody. But here the setting
is provided by the current, constituted meanings in already
expressed and uttered words, such that meaning In authentic
speech configures the acquired meanings in the existing lexi¬
con. Natural languages are, so to speak, the flesh for new
meanings and thoughts which tend towards their own Incarn¬
ation, their presence in the world.
C. THE DIRECT PRESENCE OF THOUGHT IN EXPRESSION
Speech and thought intertwine with each other, the
word being the embodiment of an immanent sense, and speech
and word together must be regarded as the direct presence
of thought in the world, Words themselves form, a compre¬
hensible text, and once formed there inhabits in it an in¬
separable style, an existential meaning beneath the concep¬
tual meaning of words. The significance of the process of
expression therefore lies not so much in its leaving something
to remind us of our thoughts, as in its act of bringing meaning
into existence, thereby opening a new dimension to our ex-
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perience,This is best illustrated in music, in which a
sonata is right in the configuration of notes which are not
y
'signs' of the music. And in a successful performance the
bare sounds produced by an instrument is effaced in favour
of the music; the music succeeds in making its presence in
the world. The sense-giving intention which projects itself
and obtains its embodiment in the world of signs, each
having their respective ready-made meanings in the lexicon,
is exactly like a gesture in which is contained the unity
of the expressive sign and the expressed meaning, Thought
and expression, then are simultaneously constituted, when
our cultural store is put at the service of this unknown
law, as our body suddenly lends itself to some new gesture
,] 7
in the formation of habit,'' The sense-giving intention is
not sorrtething positive, a fortiori is it no t an explicit
thought, What gives us the false impression that thought
can exist prior to speech is the existing stock of already
constituted and expressed thought, which, being embodied
in our acquired vocabulary, we can silently recall to our-
selves, and through which we acquire the illusion of an
1 Q
inner life. As long as we live in this world of already
constituted meanings, expression, comprehension and think¬
ing demand no real effort from us, and we become unaware of
the original and originary acts of expression and communi¬
cation, which are experienced by the child in learning to
speak and by the writer or the composer in their endeavours
to articulate something novel, something never expressed
before, a transformation of silence into the medium of
expression. At the threshold of expression the sense-giving
intention is, however, not a process of thinking, but is a
certain lack which is asking to be made good, and my tak¬
ing it up is my projection in to a new world, a synchroni¬
zing change of my own existence, a transformation of my
.„ 19
being.
V. THE NON-ARBITRARINESS OF LINGUISTIC SIGNS
But now the question arises as to how the existing
available meanings come to be constituted in a language.
Although a gesture and its meaning can be said to form a
united whole, a sign and its meaning seem to be related
arbitrarily. Merleau-Ponty admits that all verbal forms,
when considered in Ics conceptual aspect, appear to be
arbitrary conventions, but it may not appear so if we come
to the emotional content of words, which he includes in
what he calls the 'gestural sense' of words, The tones and
accents, the predominance of certain vowels or consonants,
the particular syntactic structures of a language etc.
do not represent so many arbitrary conventions for express¬
ions of one and the same idea, hut several ways for the humai
body to sing the world's praises and in the last resort to
live it. Hence the full meaning of a language is never tran-
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slatable into another, They represent the ways and styles
in which a community responds to their experience of the
world, a concrete expression of a world view appropriate to
a given culture. Thus they are never external to the meaning;
which are in them. Their totality constitutes what Wilhelm
yon Humboldt calls an 'internal speech-form1 (innere Spraeri¬
form) which is precisely the juncture of pure thought
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and language, J Words of a language are not exactly replace¬
able by words of another language in the sense that if we
switch to another language in expressing the ssm thing
we end up saying something more or something less and often
in a different way, A conventional sign which merely repre¬
sents a pure and transparent thught is non-existent since
each word is compact with its history inscribed with efforts
of communication.
This is not to say that the linguistic sign is re¬
ducible to the natural one, since there is no natural sign
for man. Man's anatomical make-up presents limitations but
never dictates what specific gestures he should make in face
of a given stimulus, Man possesses the power of giving
form to stimulus and the situation in which he is placed.
Our bodies equip us with a range of possibilities and both
our gestures and mariners of handling situations vary from
culture to culture. The uses we make of our bodies in kiss¬
ing, smiling, greeting someone and expressions of anger etc.
are cultural, and in this sense transcend our biological
nature. Feelings and passional conducts are invented like
words.Everything is both cultural and natural in man
since man is constantly modifying and giving shape to his
animal nature,... and cause forms of vital behavior to
deviate from their pre-ordained direction, through a sort
of leaking, and through a genius for ambiguity which might
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serve to define man. The meanings created by man are both
transcendent and immanent. It is transcendent in relation to
Man's biological make-up, yet it is immanent to man's behav¬
ior since meaning is embodied and present in it. Viewed in
this light, speech is merely a. particular mode of man's
various behaviours.
This thesis is fundanr ital to Merleau-Ponty's threefold
division of the world nto the physical order, the
vital order and the ti an order in The Structure of
Behavior.
VI. THE OPENING IN BEING
Merleau-Ponty points out that there are several
characteristics which differentiate speech from other forms
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of expressive behavior. First, speech is interwoven with
the whole of our experience. Efforts of expression establish
for themselves sediments of meaning which can be employed
again and again, perhaps each time with modifications, so
a
that they constitute an evolving network of human relation¬
ships. Second, speech implants in us the idea of truth be¬
cause each effort at expression is directed towards a common
world among speaking subjects, while in music the com¬
poser or player aim at delivering a new world to the listner.
And this idea of truth haunts every philosopher who aspires
for a form of discourse that is ultimate and supersedes all
others, whereas no painter or musician will suppose that
the world of expression can be exhausted. Third, speech
can be indefinitely reiterated with relative ease such that
it tends to efface its own presence, its own indispen s a b x 1 x L y
for meaning, inspiring in philosophers the ideal of pure
thought without words. The idea of music without words co
picture without colours is at once absurd. Fourth, speech,
c The ideality of speed is founded on the fact that
the audible sign is pi educed directly by the will
without the necessity of any external detour such as
is needed in painting r musical composition. This
has been pointed out 1 r Jacques Derrida in his book
Speech and Phenomena However, discussion of Derrida's
anti-phenomenological osition is quite beyond the
scope of this thesis.
with its sediments of meaning can be an object of itself.
We can speak about speech but this reflexivity is not present
in painting or music. There is thus a privileged position
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accorded to Reason. The peculiarities of speech tend to
drift us toward idealistic positions which, in one way or
another, assert the primacy of a pure, disembodied thought
or the primacy of the reflexivity of consciousness, These
tendencies have been discussed in the foregoing sections
which aim at placing thought back into the phenomenon of
expression. Merleau-Ponty claims that the new conception
of language underlying his discussions is supported by
the data of linguistic pathology.
The concrete descriptions that are in the studies of
aphasia moves the theory not so much towards intellectual!sm
as existentialism and enriches the conception of language
itself. For Merleau-Ponty the existentialist theory of
aphasia takes thought and language as two manifestations of
the same fundamental activity of man: the projection towards
a world. In the case of the amnesiac mentioned earlier the
patient's lack of the so called categorial act is not actual¬
ly a lack of a thought or of the act of recognition. What
the patient is not capable or is a certain of relating
himself to the world in the experience of colour. On account
of his brain injury the visi: .1 field itself does not present
the patient with any sort oil grouping according to principles.
Each coloured object is discrete and resists any active form¬
ation according to various requirements; the slightest re¬
lation of resemblance exhibited between two coloured objects
becomes unstable and shifting. The disturbance touches the
structuring of the perceived world which in normal subjects
is made possible by the categorial attitude, not by any pure
act of a transcendental function of consciousness. Speech
is based on this categorial attitude and not on pure thought,
Categorial behaviour and the possession of meaning¬
ful language are related in one phenomenon and cannot be
reduced to one another. For the patient of amnesia words are
still with him, but something has been lost in them. They
become emptied and cannot be used in categorial behaviour,
When asked to pick up things of a certain colour the baffled
patient repeats the name of the colour as if something isA. i. O
to be expected from the word. Mid this something is not
the word's former associations, for many aphsiacs have their
ability of association intact. What is lost is the living
meaning inhabited in the word which is different from the
word's external associations. Now since language is not an
accompaniment of inner thought, as has been discussed above,
we are therefore led to recognize a gestural or existential
2
significance in speech, as wt have already said.
The act of speakin• and expression is the body's
act of transcendence. In mak g the phonetic gesture the
body transcends its natural powers and gives the world
of meaning a certain configuration. Here the mute behavior
of the body is suddenly transfigured in the service of a
new law, a new realm of meaningful behaviour, and the
subject in that very act of expression takes up a position
in the world of meaning, and if the speech is authentic, it
will put up new meanings in the world of ready-made and
acquired meanings (which themselves must have once been
new to the world). ''We must therefore recognise as an ultim¬
ate fact this open and indefinite power of giving signifi-
cance- that is, both of apprehending and conveying a
meaning- by which man transcends himself towards a new
form of behaviour, or towards other people, or towards his
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own thought, through his body and through his speech.'
Speech is possible by virtue of the co-ordination
of different layers of capacity: the visual, the motorial
(articulatory) and the conceptual. This accounts for the
varieties of linguistic disturbance in which the affected
part is sometimes the vocal organs, sometimes the word's
physiognomy, sometimes the intention or configuration of
words, sometimes the immdedl ite meaning of the word and some-
an
times the structure and patterning of the whole of experience,
Although these different lay rs may be isolated, it is im¬
possible to find disturbance at one pure layer, for example,
the purely motor layer, whic does not affect the meaning
of words occurring in the pi duction of speech.
However, there is a more fundamental notion
which enables us to integrate the different layers of sign-
ificance ranging from the visual to the conceptual. This
notion is that of the opening in being. To elucidate this,
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Merleau-Ponty cites again the case of Schneider, an
aphasiac whose powers of thought and mobility appear to
he intact. His syntax and vocabulary are still with him but
his 1inguistic behaviour is impaired. He se1dom speaks except
when he is questioned. Fie can never use language to describe
possible states of affairs and make false statements (like
it is rainging now, uttered while the sky in fact is clear).
And when he speaks he must prepare his sentences before utter-
ing them. His experience never presents him with the inspir-
ation to sneak because it is settled, self-sufficient and
stifling; he is more 'close to life' than the normal person.
Through this contrast, Merleau-Ponty says, we can perceive
the essence of normal language: the intention to speak can
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reside only in an open experience, an experience in which
there are novelties, wonders and doubts that give ur the
initiative to speak. The constituted vocabulary and syntax
of an existing language is the incarnated subject's means
of relating to others and to himself. The sediments of the
spoken word in a culture is the flesh in which the sense-
giving intention incarnates. This intention is somewhere
23
at a point beyond being.5 t is not something positive but
it aims at making up for its non-being in speech. Speech
34
is thus the surplus of our cistence over natural being,4o;
and after its occurrence in the world, i.e. after the
act of expression, linguistic sediments are again deposited
and allowed to fall back into being. The medium of express¬
ion of writers, the efforts at expression of the child,
artists and philosophers is founded on the word-in-the-
speaking which is in turn made possible by an ever-recreated
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opening in the plenitude of being. This is, according to
Merleau-Ponty, what lies at the basis and can integrate the
different layers of significance found in the phenomenon of
speech. Such is the function writes Merleau-Ponty, which
we intuit through language, which reiterate itself, which
is its own foundation, or which, like a wave, gathers and
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poises itself to hurtle beyond its own limits.
This examination of the phenomenon of speech shows
clearly the body's ability of projecting meaning into the
surrounding world. At the perceptual level, the body achieves
a dialectical interchange of meaning with, the natural world
through its set of tasks and projects. At the level of
expression, the body transcends itself to a cultural world
of signs with sedimented significations and becomes the speaking
subject- the speaking body, the sense giving intention of
which obtains embodiment in the cultural world and trans¬
figures the meaning-loaded signs towards a new sedimentation.
Through this characterization of the speaking subject not
only is thought and body restored to its original unity,
accomplishing thereby an incarnation of the thinking sub-
ject in the sensible world, but the mystery or marvel of
the flesh is further revealed.
CHAPTER FOUR
CONCLUSION
We are now In a position to sum up Merleau-Ponty's att¬
empt at interpreting one aspect of our conscious life, viz.
that of speaking, in terms of the pre-conscious, viz. the
functions of the body•subject. In the first place he shows
that language is not a dead crust that is external to thought.
Otyithe one hand the units of language, especially the word,
has meaning, and this meaning is not originated in the cons¬
cious subject, for Saussure has taught us that linguistic
meaning resides laterally among the interplay of differences
and oppositions within the system of language. On the other
1
hand, thought is entirely 'freighted with, language; it
is merely Inner speech and cannot claim to have an existence
marginal to speech. Thought, however, is incarnated In the
system of linguistic signs only through the function of
speech. For speech is the moment at which the body-subject
takes up Its stance in the system of linguistic signs,
thereby transforming their value (what we call the lateral
meaning of linguistic signs within a system) Into signific¬
ation (the conceptual aspect of actual speech) that exists
2
for the speaking-subject. The body-subject plays the central
role in the production of speech because the possibility of
language ultimately lies in an open experience, i.e. the
body's capacity of opening up onto the world, taking up the
world's challenge while projecting fields of meaning (sign¬
ification) into its milieu- or succinctly, its being a pro¬
ject. Thus as the embodiment of thought, speech is an aspectW c?' A. i,
of the body-subject's transcendence towards the world of
culture. Through this movement the body-subject is elevated
to a higher plane of existence.
It remains for us to see whether other aspects of
our conscious life can be interpreted in a similar fashion.
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